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Using typologies by Benoit (1995), Seeger (2006), and Heath (2006) this study 
argues that when an organization encounters multiple complications (e.g., perceived guilt, 
magnitude of harm, nature of the victims, etc.) compounding a crisis situation, that the 
organization’s best course of action is to employ atonement rhetoric. Second, this study 
also argues for the inclusion of a new best practice in crisis communication, which 
highlights the importance of organizations to recognize the impact visual evidence, 
especially video footage, has on complicating crisis response while also increasing 
demand for an appropriate and timely response. To do this the study uses the above 
typologies as well as Koesten and Rowland (2004) to carry out a rhetorical analysis of the 
NFL’s response to the Ray Rice crisis. This study finds that the NFL’s crisis response 
through the first three phases, though using nearly all of Benoit’s (1995) strategies, fails 
to meet all of Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s (2006) best practices. It is only through 
meeting the requirements for atonement set out by Koesten and Rowland (2004) that the 
NFL meets the recommended best practices and achieves resolution from this crisis.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Ware and Linkugel (1973) first presented apologia, and put a name to the 
form of rhetorical response that follows after a person (or organization) has been accused 
of some form of wrongdoing. From this initial introduction, numerous scholars have 
attempted to add to this body of scholarship by investigating and identifying specific 
crisis response strategies (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; 
Hearit, 1995; Heath, 2006; Seeger, 2006; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). However, 
nearly a decade after Ware and Linkugel’s original treatise, Kruse (1981) argued that the 
realm of team sport embodies unique situational factors that affect the apologetic rhetoric 
of individuals in the sports arena in ways not previously discussed in the apologetic 
literature. Kruse’s seminal article on this communicative intersection has given rise to 
many new studies focusing on the nuances of this context (See Blaney, Lippert, & Smith, 
2013). However, much of the literature has focused on singular individuals making 
amends for personal actions, which carried significant personal and professional 
repercussions for themselves and their teams. The following study was carried out to fill a 
gap in the literature by applying these theories to new contexts in order to extend their 
application and the understanding of how they work in various situational contexts. 
Specifically, this study adds to the understanding of effective crisis response by analyzing 
a sports governing body’s response to a prolonged organizational crisis, which included a 
multi-strategy approach and contained several distinctive stages of response. 
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 Under the leadership of Commissioner Roger Goodell the National Football 
League (NFL) has been no stranger to controversy or crisis. The League and Goodell 
have been scrutinized and often criticized throughout his leadership for the handling of 
various crises. For example, the Michael Vick dogfighting scandal broke shortly after 
Goodell was hired in 2007 (as cited in Jerome, 2009; Rhoden, 2007). More recent crises 
include referee lockouts (Boren, 2012; Brooks, 2012; Pearson, 2012) and controversies 
surrounding game violence and player concussion rates (Kass, 2014; Keating, 2012; 
Slothower, 2013). However, under Goodell’s nine-year leadership, arguably no crisis has 
resulted in as many fumbled attempts to salvage the image and reputation of the NFL as 
the recent scandals involving violence perpetrated by NFL players off the field.  
In 2014, league crises involving charges of domestic violence, child abuse, and 
sexual assault by its players brought serious speculation about the culture of violence 
cultivated and perpetuated by the sport, as well as grave accusations regarding the 
complacency of NFL officials to domestic violence incidents involving NFL players. 
Among the whirlwind of story lines playing out during this time, the domestic violence 
case involving former Baltimore Ravens running back, Ray Rice, became the focal eye in 
the media maelstrom.  
 The NFL’s overall crisis involving players and charges of domestic violence and 
abuse first started in February 2014 with the arrest of Rice and his then-fiancée, Janay 
Palmer. On February 15th, Rice and Palmer became involved in an altercation while in an 
elevator at the Revel Casino Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey (“Key events,” 2014; Van 
Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014). Later that same day, Rice and Palmer were both charged 
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with simple assault, and on February 19th, celebrity news group, TMZ, released “video 
[footage] of Rice dragging Palmer out of the elevator in which the incident occurred” 
(“Key events,” 2014, p. 6). In the months to come, charges against Palmer were dropped 
while Rice’s charge of simple assault was increased to a single felony charge of 
aggravated assault (Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014). In the days immediately 
following the incident, Baltimore Ravens’ officials such as general manager, Ozzie 
Newsome, and Ravens head coach, John Harbaugh, released statements supporting Rice 
and assuring the general public that Rice would play during the 2014 season (Downing, 
2014a; Hanzus, 2014; Hensley, 2014; Sobleski, 2014). Over the next few months, Ravens 
officials continued to speak in support of Rice, even after his indictment, which took 
place the day before his wedding ceremony to Palmer (“Key events,” 2014; Van Natta & 
Van Valkenburg, 2014). Ravens owner, Steve Bisciotti, added to these assurances and 
also commented on the need for compassion for Rice and his family (Mink, 2014). As 
Ravens executives attempted to respond to the publicity surrounding this crisis, the NFL, 
as the governing body over this team, remained relatively silent about the entire incident 
(Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014).  
 It was not until June 16, 2014 that NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell, met 
privately with Rice and Palmer to discuss the events of February 15th, and it was another 
month before the NFL made any official comments, as an organization, about the scandal 
(“Key events,” 2014). After Rice’s attorney successfully got him admitted into a pre-trial 
diversionary program intended for first-time offenders (which cleared him of the charge 
after a year) on May 20, 2014, the NFL officially suspended Ray Rice for the first two 
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games of the 2014 season (“Key events,” 2014; Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014). 
According to an ESPN article, “Almost immediately [after this suspension], there was 
widespread criticism of and questions about Goodell’s investigation, evidence and 
judgment” in this crisis (Van Natta and Van Valkenburg, 2014, para. 64). Many critics of 
the suspension argued that it was too lenient and seemingly arbitrary, citing instances 
where players had received longer suspensions for “seemingly less harmful violations, 
such as smoking marijuana” (Belson, 2014a, para. 4). Critics further argued that such 
leniency demonstrated a lack of concern about domestic violence and a “cavalier attitude 
towards violence against women” (Fitzgerald, 2014, para. 4). 
For the next month, Goodell contended with criticism for his judgment in the Rice 
case by speaking publicly at conferences and announcing new domestic violence policies 
for the organization and its members (“Key events,” 2014). Then, on September 8, 2014, 
TMZ released a second video, this one clearly showing what took place inside the 
elevator of the Revel Casino Hotel on the morning of February 15, 2014 (“Key events,” 
2014; Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014). The second video showed footage of Rice 
throwing a “crushing left hook to Janay’s face,” causing her to hit her head against the 
elevator railing and falling to the floor unconscious (Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014, 
para. 76). Both the general public and the NFL’s reactions following the release of this 
second video were quick and decisive. On the same day as the release of the second 
video, the Baltimore Ravens terminated the remainder of Rice’s five-year, $35 million 
contract, and within an hour of the team decision, the NFL also released a statement 
banning Rice from the league indefinitely (Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014). In the 
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days and weeks to follow, media outlets and news articles echoed renewed public 
concerns about who in the NFL knew about the extent of the violence perpetrated by Rice 
and for how long, and just how lenient the two-game suspension appeared in light of this 
second video (Red, 2014; Breech, 2014).  
After the NFL announced its decision to indefinitely suspend Rice from the 
league, the organization provided multiple statements and interviews to answer 
accusations of complacency and cover-up regarding the handling of the case prior to the 
second video’s release (“Key events,” 2014; Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014). 
Questions about the NFL’s conduct in this crisis were revisited again in late November 
2014 when former U.S. District Judge Barbara S. Jones granted Rice’s appeal and 
reinstated him to the league (Belson, 2014b; McCann, 2014; O’Conner, 2014). Jones’ 
ruling favored Rice’s argument that he was penalized twice for the same incident, a 
violation of one of the articles in the collective bargaining agreement, which specifically 
forbids “double punishment for the same act or conduct” (McCann, 2014, p.). Jones’s 
decision further described Goodell’s decision and reasoning about suspending Rice from 
the league as arbitrary and vague, thus, making the NFL’s response appear more 
suspicious (O’Connor, 2014; Belson, 2014b). After this court censure, the NFL’s 
response and cleanup continued on for several more months, nearly a year after the 
inciting incident, and the organization released press statements, reports, and policy 
approvals on into January 2015. 
Out of nearly a dozen cases being reported on in the media during this time, no 
case received the same amount of attention from the media or the NFL as the Rice case. 
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Further, no other player’s case resulted in the same suspensions as Rice’s. Thus, this case 
stands as a particularly noteworthy point of analysis within the realms of sports and crisis 
communication. 
 The Rice case is also unique because his personal crisis of image ensnared the 
entire NFL organization and resulted in a multi-phase crisis response. Therefore this 
study analyzes the specific crisis response messages released by Roger Goodell and the 
NFL in the wake of the media trial involving Rice and his wife, Janay Palmer. 
Specifically, this study argues two main points. First, that when an organizational crisis 
includes multiple extenuating factors (e.g., perceived guilt, magnitude of harm, nature of 
the victims, data showing guilt, and violation of traditional moral standards) that 
compound and complicate the crisis situation, the organization’s best course of action is 
to employ atonement rhetoric in its crisis response. Second, this study also argues for an 
additional best practice to be added to Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s (2006) lists. This new 
best practice highlights the importance of organizations to recognize the impact visual 
evidence, especially video footage, has on complicating crisis response while also 
increasing demand for an appropriate and timely response. To make these arguments, the 
study investigates and analyzes early crisis responses made by the NFL using Benoit’s 
(1995) strategies of crisis response and then applies Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s (2006) 
list of best practices in crisis communication to see how well the responses meet those 
recommendations. Additionally, this study looks at how those early responses contributed 
to the crisis situation and led to the organization’s eventual use of Koesten and 
Rowland’s (2004) theory of atonement rhetoric to repair its own reputation in the 
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aftermath of the scandal. This analysis will be rooted in key organizational crisis 
literature that will be outlined in Chapter 2. 
 This study is important to the fields of organizational and crisis communication 
for three main reasons. First, as a case study, the NFL crisis involving Rice and his felony 
assault charge offers an interesting look at a unique series of events, which led a large 
public organization to respond publicly to the personal crisis of one of its members. 
Blaney, Lippert, and Smith (2013) compiled one of the first collections of essays 
specifically focusing on image repair within the sports arena; however, of the 21 
collected articles, only a handful include a governing body or organization in their scope 
of analysis, and even then, none of these crises demonstrate an instance where a public 
sports organization is ensnared in a crisis originally caused by a single individual player 
within the organization. 
In this case, Rice was not just a member of the Baltimore Ravens, but an 
extremely public personae and extenuation of the team and the NFL. His very public 
friendship with Baltimore Mayor, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, along with his many 
appearances at local charity events and fundraising and awareness raising endeavors for 
campaigns helping sick and disadvantaged children created a very strong association 
among Rice, the Ravens, the NFL, and these community outreach groups (Van Natta & 
Van Valkenburg, 2014). Even more prominently, prior to this scandal, “Rice was the 
longtime spokesman for M&T Bank, one of the team’s main sponsors and one that has its 
name on the Raven’s stadium” (Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014, para. 18).  
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 Due to Rice’s very public celebrity and association with the Ravens, and therefore 
the NFL, his personal crisis became a threat to the corporate social legitimacy of both the 
Ravens and the NFL. Hearit (1995) explained that “corporations exist in a state of 
dependency upon their environments” and that an organization’s social legitimacy and 
ability to thrive relies on a “publicly recognized congruence between the values of a 
corporation and those of a larger social system in which it operates” (p. 2). Therefore, this 
study’s main focus looks at the NFL’s response rather than the Ravens’ response for two 
reasons. First, the NFL is the overarching and governing body for all NFL teams, 
meaning that any crisis involving a member of any team could potentially require league 
response. Second, the expectation that a governing body is responsible for responding to 
the crisis of an individual member or team is demonstrated by the amount of media 
coverage that focused on the NFL’s response throughout this crisis.  
A second reason for the importance of this study is that, again, as a case study, 
this crisis offered an excellent point from which to analyze not only the function of the 
strategies outlined in Benoit’s (1995) Theory of Image Restoration in responding to a 
crisis of this nature, but also the ways in which the use or disregard for the best practices 
delineated by Seeger (2006) and Heath (2006) play into the effectiveness of an image 
repair campaign. Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s (2006) recommendations are newer and 
less tested than Benoit’s typology, thus the current study’s use of these recommendations 
as points of analysis expands the literature concerning crisis communication. Throughout 
this crisis, both journalistic reviews and organizational admissions by the NFL 
demonstrated a complete lack of consistency in applying any of these standard 
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recommendations, let alone all of them. Thus, this crisis offered the ability to both 
pinpoint where the organization failed on each recommendation, but also provided an 
excellent teaching illustration for why these recommendations are important and how an 
organization can further exacerbate a crisis situation when the crisis response is not 
planned, consistent, and meeting the needs and demands of the organizational publics. 
Last, this crisis also offers an example for suggesting the expansion of these best 
practices to include specific recommendations regarding crises that involve visual 
evidence of misconduct (especially of a graphic or violent nature) made available to the 
general public. 
 The final reason for the importance of this study is its ability to extend the 
application of atonement rhetoric in the field of crisis communication. Currently, The 
Rhetoric of Atonement, as a theory, is largely untested, with only a handful of applied 
case studies (Jerome, 2008; Koesten & Rowland, 2004; Shepard, 2009). This study offers 
the opportunity to provide an additional example of atonement rhetoric by testing its 
principles using the crisis response of a sports governing body. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4,  a series of failed crisis response messages and the release of the second video 
showing Rice punching Palmer, forced the NFL to make very definitive decisions and 
statements regarding the organization’s involvement in this scandal, each of which 
closely aligned with the specific actions and statements required for an entity to make 
amends through atonement rhetoric, as outlined by Koesten and Rowland (2004). 
Therefore, this case study offered the opportunity to analyze how an organization can 
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also benefit from using this particular crisis strategy, especially after other responses have 
been employed but fallen short of their goal. 
  
 11 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following chapter will look at the relevant literature in the intersecting areas 
of organizational communication and crisis response. This literature review will be 
divided into three primary sections: literature on organizational crisis and image 
restoration, literature on organizational crisis and apologia, and literature on atonement 
rhetoric as a specific form of apologia. 
Organizational Crisis and Image Restoration 
First, it is important to start with an understanding of what constitutes a crisis. 
This study is situated in Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer’s (1998) definition of organizational 
crisis, “a specific, unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of 
events which creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an 
organization’s high priority goals” (as cited in Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 7). 
The word “crisis” on its own conjures up many negative connotations, but when crisis is 
observed at the organizational level, those connotations take on larger and more 
threatening proportions. For example, Seeger et al. (2003) asserted, “organizations seen 
as causing a crisis may lose legitimacy, credibility, reputation, and ultimately income” (p. 
4). Thus, it is important to understand how to effectively and competently respond to 
crisis situations at the organizational level. However, this goal is easier said than done as 
Benoit (1995) pointed out, “The need for discourse designed to restore our reputation 
arises because, as human beings, we inevitably engage in behavior that makes us 
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vulnerable to attack” (p. 67), and that the source of these behaviors can stem from a 
myriad of motivations including self-interests, scarce resources, difference in opinion or 
goals, to simple mistake or unforeseen events (Benoit, 1995). Regardless of source of 
motivation, in addition to the threat of significant financial loss posed by crisis, 
organizations risk a potentially greater social loss through organizational reputation. 
Benoit (1995) theorized that reputation “is a crucial commodity because it contributes to 
a healthy self-image” as well as playing an important role in influencing and persuading 
audiences (p. 69). Thus, organizations that are unable to handle crises effectively can risk 
current profits as well as future profits by damaging their reputations past a point of 
recovery, which can lead to a plethora of outcomes affecting the organizations internally 
and externally. 
On the other hand, several crisis communication theorists view organizational 
crisis as a two-sided coin. Seeger et al. (2003) explained, “Crises are sources of profound 
human loss, tragedy, and agony and are also the precipitating factors for radical, rapid, 
and often positive social change” (p. 3) In this way, theorists recognized that from 
tragedy and agony can come good that might otherwise have been postponed or 
suppressed; thus, in any crisis there is potential for a silver lining. From this point of 
view, then, it is important to study what crisis is, why it is important, and how it can be 
handled in order to learn how organizations can find and utilize the silver linings of their 
crises.  
Last, when studying crisis communication, one of the most practical outcomes of 
such a study is to identify strategies for responding to crisis in both an effective and 
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competent manner. Benoit (1995) explained that communication, as it relates to crisis, “is 
best conceptualized as a goal-directed activity… [and] maintaining a positive reputation 
is one of the central goals” of that activity (p. 63). Therefore, crisis response at the 
organizational level is not simply a series of reactions to an event, but instead, should be 
a detailed and planned out strategy created prior to a crisis (Heath, 2006). At best, 
“Crisis-response strategies should affect how publics view responsibility for a crisis and 
the organization in crisis… [since] crisis situations affect these same perceptions” 
(Coombs, 1995, p. 469).  
For this reason, several crisis communication scholars have endeavored to 
compile lists and resources that identify what strategies can be used at what times and to 
what effect in crisis scenarios (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995; Benoit & Drew, 1997; 
Heath, 2006; Seeger, 2006). Benoit (1995) provided a foundational treatment on types of 
responses used in crisis by identifying fourteen different responses, which can fall under 
one of five different categories: denial, evading of responsibility, reducing offensiveness 
of event, corrective action, or mortification. Pertaining to this study, the NFL uses 11 of 
Benoit’s 14 strategies at least once throughout the crisis timeline. Therefore these 
strategies bear defining. Under denial, Benoit (1995) distinguished between simple 
denial, which is a plain statement denying the event occurred wrongdoing took place and 
shifting the blame, which argues that the individual accused is not the one who 
committed the wrongdoing. Under evading responsibility, both defeasibility and good 
intentions are relevant to this case. Defeasibility is a strategy that argues the accused 
lacked information with which to make a well-informed decision while good intentions 
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intends to justify the accused’s action based on their motives or intentions (Benoit, 1995). 
In both cases, the strategies attempt to evade responsibility for the crisis. Benoit (1995) 
listed several strategies for trying to reduce the offensiveness of the wrongdoing. 
Bolstering attempts to do this by increasing positive feelings for the accused by 
highlighting their positive actions. Minimization attempts to reduce the magnitude of the 
bad feelings towards the accused by showing that the crisis is not as bad as it appears 
while differentiation attempts to reduce bad feelings by distinguishing the crisis from 
other similar but worse events (Benoit, 1995). Benoit (1995) identified transcendence as 
another technique for reducing offensiveness by justifying wrongdoing by appealing to 
higher values. Attack the accuser is the last strategy under this category, and it relies on 
discrediting an accuser by throwing suspicion or doubt onto the credibility or motives of 
the accuser (Benoit, 1995). Last, Benoit (1995) also listed a few more accommodative 
strategies including corrective action, which seeks to make amends by fixing the source 
of the problem, and mortification, which is the act of expressing a sincere apology of 
regret and asking forgiveness for the wrongdoing.  
Following Benoit’s (1995) presentation of these strategies, Coombs (1995), 
Benoit and Drew (1997), and Coombs and Holladay (2002) took these response strategies 
and analyzed them under a lens of “appropriateness” to suggest when each should be 
used and how it might be received. Specifically for Coombs (1995), appropriateness was 
a question of responsibility and intention – is the organization responsible in any way for 
the crisis, and did the organization know about and intend to correct any threats before 
the crisis occurred? Depending on the answers to these questions, a crisis can be 
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categorized in one of four ways with a flow chart helping responders to determine a 
suitable response style. On the other side, Benoit and Drew (1997) argued that 
appropriateness, from the perspective of public audiences, can be more restrictive. Benoit 
and Drew (1997) found, in general, “strategies that were considered appropriate were also 
considered effective… [and] the strategies that were rated inappropriate were also rated 
ineffective” (p. 159). More specifically, audiences rated mortification and corrective 
action as the most appropriate and effective forms of response while also consistently 
rating bolstering, denial, minimization, and provocation as the least appropriate and 
effective (Benoit & Drew, 1997). 
Seeger (2006) provided an excellent list of recommended best practices, which 
resulted from a panel discussion of crisis communication experts, and Heath (2006) 
added additional insight to these recommendations. These works reinforce previous 
scholarship on crisis response by providing specific recommendations that can help crisis 
responders format their responses (and the strategies within those responses) in a way that 
meets the temporal and structural demands of a crisis (e.g., when to respond, how to 
respond, and to whom to respond) while also meeting certain human factors present in 
many crises (e.g., the need for demonstrating care and concern for publics and showing a 
unity in goals with organizational audiences). Again, these relative “check lists” for crisis 
responders are newer than the strategies they help to explain, therefore, testing can help 
to show the link between the function of these strategies and the goals they meet in crisis 
response.  
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However, the interplay between previous scholarship and these recommendations 
can already been seen in some aspects of crisis literature. As Coombs (1995) pointed out 
how the media can influence crisis perceptions, Seeger (2006) recommended responders 
endeavor to “meet the needs of the media and remain accessible” (p. 240) and Heath 
(2006) added to that, “be committed and able to deliver on the promise to be the first and 
best source of information” (p. 248). Coombs (1995) and Benoit and Drew (1997) both 
recommended mortification in the form of a sincere apology in many crisis situations 
because “we are often willing to forgive… when the apology seems sincere” (Benoit & 
Drew, 1997, p. 159). In the same way, Seeger (2006) made several recommendations 
along this score, including: “communicate with compassion, concern, and empathy” (p. 
241), “listen to the public’s concerns” (p.238), and “honesty, candor, and openness” (p. 
239). In addition to these four suggestions, Seeger (2006) recommended planning ahead 
for events that are both likely and unlikely to happen, creating a periodic review process 
to ensure plans are up-to-date, using language and strategies that foster and benefit public 
partnerships, working with community representatives and organizations that can 
enhance organizational credibility, accepting and acknowledging ambiguity in situations, 
and including messages of self-efficacy. Heath (2006) added to this the importance of 
understanding that crisis response functions as a narrative storyline. Thus, this study 
intends to utilize these findings and recommendations to dissect the NFL’s Ray Rice 
crisis in order to understand what strategies and recommendations were used or ignored 
and how they contributed to the escalation of the crisis. 
Organizational Crisis and Apologia 
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 Moving beyond definitions of organizational crisis and general forms of image 
repair, a review of the foundational works linking the fields of organizational crisis, 
apologia, and sports is also needed. Ware and Linkugel (1973) offered the first treatment 
of apologia as a genre of public discourse stating their belief “that apologetical discourses 
constitute a distinct form of public discourse” (p. 273), and that this form of public 
discourse “is usually a public speech of self-defense” (p. 274). However, decades later, 
Hearit (1995) distinguished the differences between individual apologia, which was the 
focus of Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) discussion, and corporate apologia, which can more 
generally be conceptualized as “apologetic efforts” (Hearit, 1995, p. 3), arguing that “An 
apologia is not an apology (though it may contain one); rather, it is a response to a social 
legitimation crisis in which an organization seeks to justify its behavior by presenting a 
compelling, counter account of its actions” (Hearit, 1995, p. 3). Coombs and Holladay 
(2002) explained, “An organization’s reputation, that is, how the organization is 
perceived by its publics, is a valued resource that is threatened by crisis” (p. 167). Thus, it 
is logical that an organization that relies on a favorable reputation in order to make profits 
and garner social influence, would feel compelled to respond to accusations that 
undermine its social legitimacy and taint its public image. 
 Hearit (1995) continued to differentiate the two forms of apologia by pointing out 
how organizations use apologia “when faced with social legitimacy crises that impair 
their economic viability” as opposed to facing charges that are strictly “against their 
moral nature”, as is seen with many of the individual accounts referenced in Ware and 
Linkugel (1973). More interesting still, Kruse (1981) brought into this discussion how 
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crises within team sports take root in a separate system of social norms and standards, 
which further differentiate themselves from other forms of organizational crisis. Kruse 
(1981) explained, “The ethic of team sport holds that the team is greater than any of its 
individual members” (p. 273), and  “Those who perceive themselves to be individuals 
rather than members of a team risk condemnation, even rejection” (p. 274). Thus, it is 
critical for team players to refrain from any activities that could negatively impact team 
performance (Kruse, 1981). Should this happen, then, “sport personalities must defend 
their moral worth as sports figures whenever their conduct might have harmful effects 
upon teams, games, or the world of sport and their actions seem to result from personal 
characteristics that make them unworthy to represent the fans” (p. 274). However, Kruse 
(1981) did include an important caveat to this; Kruse states that since winning is the 
dominant goal and “ethic” in sports some behaviors which might be found unacceptable 
outside the sports arena may be overlooked or excused if coming from a winning team or 
individual. 
 Due to the unique nature of organizational crisis and corporate apologia, the 
topics have been a popular source of study; however, with varying and sometimes 
contradictory, accounts and findings for many researchers (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 
1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Hearit, 1995; Rowland & Jerome, 2004). Despite the 
variation in outcomes, several studies have concluded that determining how to respond to 
a crisis is more complex than simply picking one of Benoit’s (1995) strategies. 
Organizational image repair must take into account factors such as the type of crisis 
taking place, but also other variants such as an organization’s responsibility in the crisis, 
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the organization’s amount of control in preventing the crisis, and the organization’s 
performance history in having and responding to similar crises (Coombs, 1998; Coombs 
& Holladay, 2002; Rowland & Jerome, 2004). Each of these factors plays into the 
success of a given crisis response and whether or not the involved publics will accept that 
response.  
However, because of the considerable amount of variation that takes place within 
this field, Rowland and Jerome (2004) argued, “strategy choice in relation to the primary 
purpose of organizational apologia – image repair responding to perceived wrongdoing – 
is heavily influenced by the specifics of the situation facing the organization. 
Consequently, it is impossible to identify an overarching strategy typology that applies to 
all subgenres of organizational apologia” (pp. 199-200). Instead, the authors suggested 
that in studying crisis response, scholars and practitioners should consider four elements 
that all organizational crisis responses use in order to perform image maintenance. Just as 
Hearit (1995) recommended that organizational apologia included “a dual strategy of a 
positive and negative rhetoric… [where] corporations seek to distance themselves from 
their illegitimate behaviors and then create identification with the public values they are 
reputed to have violated” (p. 6), Rowland and Jerome (2004) stipulate that ideal image 
maintenance should include messages that (1) demonstrate concern for victims, (2) 
bolster organizational values, (3) deny intent to do harm, and (4) indicate intent to 
prevent recurrence by pursuing the “root cause” of the crisis. At the same time, the 
authors warned that additional image repair strategies should be employed when 
organizations are perceived as guilty, when the magnitude of harm or the nature of the 
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victim is perceived as particularly detrimental, when there is data that indicates actual 
responsibility, when a crisis involves the presence or absence of a crucial third party, and 
last, when actions leading up to a crisis are perceived as violating traditional moral 
standards within the situated culture (Rowland & Jerome, 2004). Thus, in relation to this 
study, the analysis can build upon the work of previous scholars to see how the unique 
environment of the sports arena influenced the crisis situation and response, in addition to 
looking at which set of practices and recommendations were followed in the NFL’s crisis 
response strategy. 
Atonement Rhetoric 
 The last section of this review considers the rhetoric of atonement, a relatively 
new and developing subgenre of apologia that aligns with the arguments of Rowland and 
Jerome (2004). Koesten and Rowland (2004) first theorized about this subgenre when 
they argued:  
The rhetoric of atonement can be classified as a sub-genre of apologia with its 
own distinct characteristics. Where traditional apologia is used to defend one’s 
character (either an individual’s character or the character of an organization), the 
rhetoric of atonement functions as a purgative-redemptive device for an individual 
or an entire organization. Through purgation, redemption is produced and the 
relationship between the person or organization and the wronged party is healed. 
(p. 69) 
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The authors further differentiated rhetoric of atonement from other apologia strategies by 
explaining:  
Atonement rhetoric does not “restore” the image directly, but admits that sinful 
behavior has occurred in an attempt to gain forgiveness and long-term image 
restoration. Its goal is both forgiveness for a sinful act and restoration of the 
relationship once the sin has been expiated. (Koesten & Rowland, 2004, p. 69)  
Koesten and Rowland (2004) clearly stipulated that atonement rhetoric is an all or 
nothing response strategy that cannot be used in conjunction with other strategies that 
attempt to “deny, displace, or justify past actions” (p. 69). The authors explained that 
atonement rhetoric, in order to be successful, must display five critical elements. These 
elements include: (1) acknowledgement of wrongdoing and asking forgiveness, (2) 
demonstrating a complete and sincere change in attitude and relationship, (3) 
demonstrating honest change for the future, (4) committing public or private acts of 
mortification to show authenticity of remorse, and (5) publicly seeking atonement for the 
wrongdoing (Koesten & Rowland, 2004). In their work, Koesten and Rowland (2004) 
outlined examples of each of these elements using several speeches by Bill Clinton 
during his presidency. Using their examples from Clinton’s radiation apology, in October 
of 1995, Clinton formally apologized for government sanctioned human experiments on 
radiation exposure that were carried out between 1944 and 1974 (Koesten and Rowland, 
2004). To meet the first and fifth requirements of atonement rhetoric, Clinton publicly 
addressed the nation and formally acknowledged that the US government had knowingly 
sponsored these experiments without patient consent and had actively kept them secret 
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(Koesten and Rowland, 2004). To meet the second and third requirements of atonement, 
Clinton called for a change in the government’s attitude toward secrecy and its 
relationship with American citizens, and he laid out several specific steps to make sure 
these changes took place (Koesten and Rowland, 2004). Last, Koesten and Rowland 
(2004) noted that Clinton’s words demonstrated pain and regret for the government’s past 
actions, and that in combination with the steps he outlined, this met the fourth step of 
committing an act (this one was public) of mortification to show true remorse. 
 Despite its relatively recent introduction into the field, a few scholars have already 
applied this strategy to varying situations and found various insights. Jerome (2008) 
applied the concept of rhetoric of atonement to NASCAR driver, Tony Stewart’s, image 
repair campaign after he initiated a physical altercation with a photographer after a 
disappointing finish in 2002. In her analysis, Jerome (2008) found an interesting 
deviation in one of the criteria posed by Koesten and Rowland (2004). While Koesten 
and Rowland (2004) stipulated that the wrongdoer must ask for forgiveness, Jerome 
(2008) found that Stewart’s image repair campaign was successful despite the fact that 
his “key audiences actually never heard or saw Stewart ask for forgiveness outright” (p. 
132), suggesting that the person or organization using rhetoric of atonement simply has to 
“create the public perception that forgiveness was sought and/or given from the wronged 
party/parties” (p. 132) in order to meet this first criteria. 
 The remainder of this study will apply the previous insights and findings to the 
analysis of the NFL’s crisis response during the Rice domestic abuse scandal. Applying 
these concepts and findings will allow this study to see how the current case can add to 
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previous literature by supporting, extending, or negating previous literature with the case 
study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
 This research focused on analyzing official messages/artifacts created by 
NFL officials during the Ray Rice crisis. These artifacts included official NFL 
announcements, press releases, reports, and statements, provided to the public and posted 
to the “Press Releases” archive under the “NFL Communications” section of the 
organizational website (http://nflcommunications.com/category/press-releases/). 
Additional artifacts included non-NFL published news articles with statements from NFL 
officials and transcripts of personal or conference interviews with Roger Goodell. Each of 
these artifacts was collected electronically over an eight-month period starting in 
September of 2014 and progressing through April of 2015. The analysis analyzed a total 
of 27 individual artifacts ranging in date of publication from July 24, 2014 to January 8, 
2015.  
 Limiting the parameters of selection to the aforementioned artifacts was important 
for two main reasons. First, in keeping with a lens of analysis consistent with an 
organizational communication scope, it was important to restrict any artifacts or 
messages that could potentially fracture or confuse the official message and stance of the 
NFL organization. Thus, any articles, interviews, or statements that focused on responses 
or reactions from Baltimore Raven’s executives or officials, messages from players, 
executives, officials from any other team in the NFL, or personal statements from family 
and friends of any involved parties were incorporated into the study only when they (the 
artifacts) inform the NFL’s statements and assist in understanding the response 
campaign’s success/failure. Second, limiting artifacts to only messages put out by Roger 
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Goodell and other NFL officials also allowed for an additional point of analysis in this 
study to see what information the organization felt warranted a post to their 
organizational website versus what messages or information the organization decided not 
to highlight on their own news resources. This additional point of analysis added insight 
into the ways the organization responded to each point of crisis throughout the nearly 
yearlong scandal. 
In carrying out this research, after collecting all texts, artifacts were grouped into 
phases of the NFL’s crisis response. Jerome (2008) provided a similar structure for her 
analysis of Tony Stewart’s atonement campaign. In Jerome (2008), as with this study, 
breaking the crisis response into distinct phases allowed the analysis to uncover how the 
events in one phase influenced the development of strategies in subsequent phases. Each 
phase consisted of a significant event within the overall NFL/Ray Rice crisis and the 
subsequent communications that come out from the NFL in response to that major event. 
Therefore, moving in chronological order, Phase One starts with the altercation between 
Rice and Palmer on February 15, 2014, and includes all responses (or nonresponse) 
through June 2014. Phase Two begins in July 2014 with the NFL’s first official 
acknowledgement of the Rice crisis, in which the organization issues a two-game 
suspension and fine for Rice’s misconduct. Following this action, the rest of the NFL’s 
communications in this phase respond to questions about this suspension. Phase Three 
begins in September 2014 with TMZ’s release of the in-elevator video footage, and 
includes communications intended to respond immediately (within the first 10 days) to 
this new event. Phase Four is more a continuation of the end of Phase Three’s 
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demonstration of atonement rhetoric, but focuses on demonstrating commitment to 
promises made, more than demonstrating change, as seen in Phase Three. This structure 
functions to demonstrate how the failures in each previous phase lead the NFL 
organization to an inevitable end, which required atonement rhetoric in order to finally 
make amends for the initial and subsequent failures. 
In carrying out the actual analysis, this study first looked at which crisis response 
strategies, as outlined in Benoit (1995), were used to respond to each significant events in 
the crisis. This first point of analysis also included some small components of content 
analysis, in which the number of strategies and their individual frequencies of use were 
recorded in order to see which of these strategies was more heavily relied upon in each 
communication and phase. Second, the analysis looked at how the major events in the 
crisis met (or did not meet) the standards set forth in the best practices of crisis response, 
as discussed in Seeger (2006) and Heath (2006). All artifacts were analyzed using a 
rhetorical analysis, or close textual reading that is informed and focused based on the lens 
provided in selected academic works. In this textual reading, Benoit’s (1995) crisis 
response strategies along with their definitions and goals, were the selected lens for 
analysis. Therefore, all artifacts were reviewed in chronological order, and statements or 
arguments made within each communication, were reviewed for strategic intent based 
upon the definitions outlined in Benoit (1995). For example, during an interview in Phase 
Three, Goodell makes a statement that denied any knowledge about seeing the in-elevator 
video before its release by TMZ. This statement only intends to deny that wrongdoing 
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(e.g., seeing and withholding the video) took place, thus, based on Benoit’s definition, 
this statement was recorded as a statement of simple denial.  
After all artifacts were reviewed and statements were assigned a specific crisis 
response strategy, then communications were analyzed using Seeger’s (2006) and 
Heath’s (2006) “check lists” of best practices. Under this review, each phase’s 
communications were analyzed together, and based upon the media reports of the public 
reactions to these responses, the subject and content of each response within a given 
phase, and the responses in proceeding phases, each phase was evaluated for how well 
the organizational responses met or did not meet the recommended best practices. This 
second point of analysis is found at the end of each phase section, after Benoit’s (1995) 
strategies are first identified, in order to show how these strategies can work to meet or 
fail to meet the best practices. 
These first two analyses lead to the last stage of analysis in this close textual 
reading. This last stage is informed by a second theory, Koesten and Rowland’s (2004) 
theory, Rhetoric of Atonement. As argued in Chapter 4, Phases Three and Four in the 
NFL’s crisis response require the use of atonement rhetoric to achieve resolution in this 
crisis because communications in Phases One, Two, and part of Three failed to meet the 
demands of the crisis through implementation of Benoit’s (1995) strategies.  Thus, this 
last stage reviews the communications in Phases Three and Four, and based upon the 
intentions presented in each statement, statements and artifacts are assigned to one of the 
five requirements needed in atonement rhetoric, as presented by Koesten and Rowland 
(2004). This last stage of analysis showed how the NFL’s inability to respond correctly at 
 28 
 
 
 
the beginning of the crisis led to a situation in which its only crisis response option was 
that of atonement. Additionally, in reviewing the atonement statements while looking at 
Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s (2006) best practices, this last stage of analysis showed how 
using atonement language can help organizations meet the best practices of crisis 
communication at the same time as rebuilding their image. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 29 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
As stated in Chapter 3, this analysis of the NFL’s public responses to the Ray 
Rice crisis is divided into four distinct phases marked by significant turning points in the 
crisis timeline. The first phase in the NFL’s crisis response takes place between February 
and June in 2014. Overall, this phase is characterized as a relatively silent period in the 
NFL’s crisis response. The second phase takes place between July and August in 2014, 
and displays an organizational focus on the actions and responsibility of Rice. Phase 
Three contains organizational responses from September 2014, and marks a significant 
turning point in both the rhetoric and crisis response strategy for the NFL. At the end of 
Phase Three the NFL begins to take ownership for it’s own failings in this crisis. In the 
last phase, which takes place between November 2014 and January 2015, the NFL 
organization continues to demonstrate commitment to the promised changes in Phase 
Three, thus, also continuing to publicly meet several of the requirements for atonement. 
Phase One: Relative Silence  
 Phase One is the longest period of time in this timeline, spanning five months, 
from February 2014 to June 2014. This phase provides some of the most symbolic 
interactions while also remaining the most rhetorically empty period in the crisis. As an 
organization, the NFL remained virtually silent about the physical assault perpetrated by 
Rice against his then-fiancée, Palmer. The NFL neither acknowledged nor provided 
comments about this case during this period. At this point the NFL’s silence indicated 
that the organization did not feel this was a crisis that warranted an organizational 
response; but that it was a Ravens’ crisis, which the team had to handle.  In doing this, the 
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NFL attempted to dissociate the overall organization from the crisis created by a single 
member of one team. This strategy of dissociation is highlighted in Hearit (1995); 
however, Hearit argues that this strategy must be more active and should consist of active 
organizational messages that attempt to dissociate an organization from crisis through 
redefining the situation, and not simply remaining silent about this situation. 
 As such, at this point in the crisis, the Ravens took the lead on responding to this 
crisis. On Monday, February 17th, just two days after the incident, during a public press 
conference, Ravens general manager, Ozzie Newsome, assured interested audiences that, 
“Ray Rice was still a big part of what we plan to do in 2014” (Sobleski, 2014, para. 5). 
Newsome also stated that his assurance came after a meeting with Ravens head coach, 
John Harbaugh (Sobleski, 2014). These assurances, coming on the heels of an article 
titled “No Doubt Ravens Hitching Wagon to Ray Rice,” published on the Ravens’ official 
website on Saturday, February 15th, not only acknowledged the incident taking place 
between Rice and Palmer, but they also demonstrated a clear rhetoric of support for Rice. 
 Later the same week, Harbaugh also addressed the Rice incident while at the NFL 
Scouting Combine. The head coach reiterated Newsome’s rhetoric, but he also made sure 
to stipulate that this was “based on the information that the Ravens have received” 
(Downing, 2014a). Additionally, Harbaugh explained, “The facts will determine the 
consequences, always” and that he had not seen anything that would suggest the Ravens 
drop Rice (Hanzus, 2014). These statements were made just days after TMZ Sports 
released the first video footage outside the hotel elevator on February 19, 2014, which 
showed Rice dragging an unconscious Palmer out of the elevator (“Key events”, 2014; 
Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 2014). After this footage was released, Ravens officials 
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continued to support Rice, but also displayed more ambivalence and reservation in those 
statements of support. Days later, on February 22nd, General Manager Newsome 
responded to press questions about Rice and the TMZ video footage stating, “John said it 
best yesterday: ‘We will let the facts determine what the consequences will be’” (Corbett, 
2014, p. 4). Newsome elaborated on this, saying, “The whole video needs to be 
reviewed… I don’t know whether a different story is going to come out. The video is 
what it is” (Corbett, 2014).  
Based upon these statements, within the first week of this crisis, it is clear the 
Ravens made attempts to respond quickly to public inquiry about the Ray Rice incident 
and also that the team officials coordinated their responses in order to keep information 
consistent. These efforts positively demonstrated three of Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s 
(2006) best practices. First, responding quickly about the incident and answering 
additional questions at each press conference helped to “meet the needs of the media and 
remain accessible” for more information (Seeger, 2006, p. 240). At the same time, 
acknowledging in their statements that outcomes of the crisis depend on facts that are yet 
to be determined also positively met the principles of demonstrating an acceptance of 
uncertainty in crisis and that “crisis response is a narrative”, which requires accuracy and 
coherence to be told well (Heath, 2006, p. 247). Further, by responding quickly and 
consistently throughout this phase, the Ravens not only met Heath’s (2006) best practice 
regarding crisis response as a narrative, which requires the recognition that a crisis has a 
specific beginning (e.g., the time of the inciting incident) and that a response campaign 
must follow shortly after that beginning on through the middle to the end, but the Ravens 
also met Heath’s (2006) best practice about committing to being the first source of 
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information and Seeger’s (2006) best practice of meeting the needs of the media. The 
team did this by making sure to comment, at the very least, on the status of Rice’s 
position with the team throughout this phase. To certain audiences, fans especially, this 
would be important information, and providing this information meets these best 
practices while also showing concern for those fans’ interests, thereby meeting another 
best practice of Seeger (2006). Last, as touched on above, team statements in the latter 
part of the phase also demonstrate Seeger’s (2006) recommendations to exhibit candor 
and to accept uncertainty. By hedging their statements with comments about future 
information about this case, the Ravens appeared candid and open with the public while 
also showing acceptance in the uncertainty of the future, and thus meeting these two 
standards as well. 
Interestingly, during this phase, there was an absence of any image restoration 
strategies in these statements, which speaks to the Ravens’ attitude toward this incident.  
In almost every instance, statements put out by the team functioned to (1) acknowledge 
that the incident occurred, (2) to assure general audiences that Rice will stay with the 
team, and (3) to offer support to Rice and of Rice’s character. None of these functions 
attempted to deny the event took place, relieve responsibility or offensiveness of the 
event, or promise to fix anything after the event. If any strategy could be linked to the 
general response of the team, that strategy could be characterized as partially shifting the 
blame with a refocusing component. The analysis showed that as the phase continued on, 
and additional information and events connected to the February 15th incident came out, 
the comments changed slightly from general support to remarks focusing on Rice 
personally. For example, the Ravens stated after the indictment, “We know there is more 
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to Ray Rice than this one incident” (Wesseling, 2014, para. 7) and Bisciotti specifically 
mentioned how “disappointing” and “embarrassing” this ordeal had been for the Rices 
(Mink, 2014). These remarks, while appearing supportive of Rice, also functioned to 
remind and refocus audiences as to who committed the actions that are being talked 
about. Rhetorically, while the NFL said nothing at all, the Ravens employed language 
that suggested the team felt no responsibility for Rice’s actions and attempted to remind 
audiences that despite their support of Rice, Rice’s actions were his alone.   
 Over the next weeks and months, the Ravens continued to respond to this crisis as 
they did in the first week. Nearly five weeks after the event, Ravens team owner, Steve 
Bisciotti, released a statement saying, “I know how terribly disappointing it is to Ray and 
his fiancée, how embarrassing it is for them. I have to have compassion towards him” 
(Mink, 2014, para. 4 ). Bisciotti also stated that despite reports of additional video 
footage of the incident that “He’ll [Rice] be back with the team. He’ll definitely be back” 
(Mink, 2014, para. 7). After Rice’s indictment, the Ravens released another supportive 
statement saying, “This is part of the due process for Ray. We know there is more to Ray 
Rice than this one incident” (Downing, 2014b, para. 4). Later in May of 2014, the Ravens 
organized a press conference for Ray and Janay Rice (this is after their marriage) where 
both individuals released statements apologizing for their conduct on the morning of 
February 15th (Baltimore Sun, 2014). The consistency with which Ravens officials 
provided statements, but also stuck to their support of Rice, illustrates two things 
throughout this phase. First, the continued absence of image restoration strategies in the 
team press statements showed that the Ravens never, at least publicly, considered this 
incident a crisis threatening the team. Indeed, such actions as speaking of the Rices’ 
 34 
 
 
 
embarrassment and disappointment, and setting up a press conference where the Rices 
both publicly apologized for the incident functioned to keep the focus on them and their 
responsibility in the matter. At the same time, the Ravens’ relative success in responding 
to the media with such consistency helped provide support for Seeger’s (2006) and 
Heath’s (2006) best practice regarding crisis response as a narrative. In order to make 
sense, narratives require consistency and coherence, and the Ravens provided a consistent 
and coherent message of support, which provided audiences with information about how 
the team viewed the incident without having to make clear statements of judgment or 
discipline.   
 However, it is this same concept of narrative consistency that highlighted the 
relative silence of the NFL during this period. While the Ravens function as their own 
organization and franchise within the NFL, as the overarching and governing body of the 
collective team franchises, “Rice is subject to league review for violating its personal 
conduct policy,” (Corbett, 2014, para. 12) which means that the NFL would eventually 
have to acknowledge and respond both to Rice and the general public about this incident 
to remain consistent with its own policy. Yet, despite this eventual outcome, the NFL 
made no attempt to initiate any conversation about Rice’s personal crisis during this time. 
The only public acknowledgement, by the NFL, of the Ray Rice incident prior to July of 
2014 came in March at the NFL Annual Meeting when Commissioner Goodell, in 
response to questions about suspending Rice, Goodell said, “I don’t have any timetable… 
The federal authorities are working on it, so I don’t have any inside knowledge of that 
from anyone. But there’s no reason to take any action as of now” (Wesseling, 2014, para. 
10). From this statement, Goodell indicates no intention of stepping into this crisis, or 
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acknowledging the role the NFL will eventually play in responding to a serious breach of 
league policy. Thus, Goodell’s only response during the first phase of this crisis is to 
attempt to dissociate the league from Rice and his conduct until the legal system had 
completed its work.  
Phase Two: His Bad 
 After Rice’s acceptance into the diversionary program on May 20th, and his and 
Janay’s meeting with Goodell on June 16th, this crisis reached a turning point on July 24, 
2014, when Goodell, as NFL Commissioner, broke the NFL’s silence on the matter, and 
seemingly out of nowhere, released a statement announcing that Rice was suspended for 
the first two games of the 2014 season and would also be fined an additional game as 
penalty for violating the Personal Conduct Policy of the league (Brigidi, 2014). This 
announcement used an interesting combination of corrective action, shifting the blame, 
and bolstering response strategies as first tactics for responding to this crisis. The 
announcement stated boldly as its title “RAY RICE SUSPENDED WITHOUT PAY 
FOR TWO GAMES AND FINED AN ADDITIONAL GAME CHECK FOR 
VIOLATING NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY” (Brigidi, 2014, para. 4). The bold 
print, prominent placing, and language used, suggested the NFL was attempting to 
demonstrate corrective action to respond to this crisis. This observation was further 
supported later in the announcement when it stated, “Despite the court’s decision not to 
impose criminal punishment, the Commissioner determined, as he advised Rice, that the 
conduct was incompatible with NFL policies and warranted disciplinary action” (Brigidi, 
2014, para. 4). Pairing these two statements, it seemed the NFL was also attempting to 
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bolster its image by taking desired action where the legal system did not. Further on in 
the announcement, the NFL stated, 
The league is an entity that depends on the integrity and in the confidence of the 
public and we simply cannot tolerate conduct that endangers others or reflects 
negatively on our game. This is particularly true with respect to domestic violence 
and other forms of violence against women. (Brigidi, 2014, para. 4) 
This statement appeared to function both to distinguish between the conduct of the NFL 
and the conduct exhibited by Rice, but also to further bolster the image of the NFL 
because it upheld the socially accepted ethics regarding nonviolence towards women. 
Then, to reinforce this distinction between player and league, the NFL used the same 
combination of quasi-shifting the blame and refocusing tactics as used by the Ravens 
team officials to subtly position the NFL on the side of the public and not with Rice. The 
organization did this by including in the press release parts of a personal letter sent from 
Goodell to Rice which repeatedly referenced Rice’s culpability and responsibility: “As 
you acknowledged during our meeting, your conduct was unquestionably inconsistent 
with the league”, “You will be expected to continue to take advantage of the counseling 
and other professional service”, “I believe that you are sincere in your desire to learn 
from this matter” (Brigidi, 2014, para. 4). 
 Unfortunately for the NFL, and Goodell, this first official statement met 
significant criticism from the media, women’s groups, and several state politicians 
(Belson, 2014a: Fitzgerald, 2014; Van Natta and Van Valkenburg, 2014). Just a week 
after the release of the first statement, Goodell had to respond to questions about the Rice 
case and his suspension decision while at the NFL Hall of Fame in Canton, OH. When 
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asked how he determined the two-game suspension, Goodell claimed that “you look at all 
of the facts that you have available” (“NFL commissioner Roger Goodell – Media,” 
2014). He also noted, “Law enforcement normally… has more information, facts” before 
saying, “The criminal justice system, as you know, put him in a diversionary program 
with no discipline, and we felt it was appropriate to have discipline” (“NFL 
commissioner Roger Goodell – Media,” 2014). Here, Goodell admitted that the legal 
system often has more information with which to make informed decisions, yet in this 
instance, the NFL had enough information to feel the legal outcome of this case did not 
reflect appropriate action. However, in the very next statement, after being asked about 
the public criticism to the punishment Goodell did give Rice, Goodell tried to explain his 
good intentions saying, “When we make decisions we always get reactions. We 
understand that, we listen to it, and we use it to make ourselves better” (“NFL 
commissioner Roger Goodell – Media,” 2014). Taken together, it seemed that Goodell’s 
attempts to bolster the NFL’s image by juxtaposing the NFL’s action in punishing Rice 
with the legal system’s supposed inaction in not punishing him did little to meet its 
intended purpose. 
 The argument that Goodell’s first two attempts to respond to the Ray Rice crisis 
were not sufficient is affirmed three weeks later when he released a letter to all NFL 
owners about domestic violence policy in the league. As a whole, the letter moved 
through five stages. First, the very beginning of the letter started off with a commitment 
by Goodell to the game and the sport, saying, “My focus has been on ensuring that the 
NFL is held in the highest regard… [and] my commitment has always been to do what is 
right and to protect the integrity of the game” (Gantt, 2014, para. 1). Next, Goodell made 
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statements approaching mortification when he stated, “My disciplinary decision led the 
public to question our sincerity, our commitment… I take responsibility both for the 
decision and for ensuring that our actions in the future properly reflect our values. I didn’t 
get it right” (Gantt, 2014, para. 3). Still, despite taking ownership for the botched crisis 
response, Goodell did not fully commit to mortification since he did not expressly ask 
forgiveness. Goodell did attempt to make amends when moving into the third stage of the 
letter, which demonstrated corrective action for the previous transgression. The next 
several paragraphs listed promises of future commitment and action to correct the issues 
exposed by this crisis. Goodell promised,  
We will listen openly, engage our critics constructively, and seek continuous 
improvement… We will use this opportunity to create a positive outcome by 
promoting policies of respect for women both within and outside the workplace. 
We will work with nationally recognized experts to ensure that the NFL has a 
model policy on domestic violence. (Gantt, 2014, para. 4) 
Goodell also demonstrated what corrective actions he had already taken, explaining, 
In the past few weeks, I have reviewed all aspects of our Personal Conduct Policy 
and met with a wide range of experts… as well as with the NFLPA and many of 
you. Those discussion will continue. They have helped us to identify a number of 
steps that will better communicate our position and strengthen our policies. 
(Gantt, 2014, para. 5) 
As he listed several specific steps that the league will undertake to demonstrate 
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corrective action, Goodell also started to incorporate elements of transcendence, 
primarily by trying to show how the community will benefit from the league going 
through this crisis. Goodell wrote 
Outside groups we met with have emphasized that the NFL can play an important 
role in communities throughout the nation. Consistent with that advice, we will 
expand the educational components in our college, high school and youth football 
programs that address domestic violence and sexual assault… In the coming 
months, we will explore meaningful ways to incorporate domestic violence and 
sexual assault awareness and prevention into our public service work. (Gantt, 
2014, para. 11-12). 
These promises not only offered corrective action but they also argued how the NFL can 
claim transcendence from this crisis by taking what was learned from this crisis and 
benefiting the greater community, especially the youth, with this new knowledge. Despite 
this rhetoric of growth and transcendence, Goodell ended his letter by attempting to 
reduce the negativity toward his unpopular two-game suspension decision by using 
differentiation and minimization tactics. Goodell packaged this tactic by presenting the 
new policies and penalties regarding domestic violence in the Personal Conduct Policy. 
However, he made sure to go into detail about what actions will merit harsher penalties 
than the ones outlined in the new policy. Specifically, he mentioned, “Among the 
circumstances that would merit a more severe penalty would be a prior incident before 
joining the NFL, or violence involving a weapon, choking, repeated striking, or when the 
act is committed against a pregnant women or in the presence of a child” (Gantt, 2014, 
para. 13). Then Goodell went on to say, “With very few exceptions, NFL personnel 
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conduct themselves in an exemplary way” (Gantt, 2014, para. 14). Thus, the first 
statement attempted to reduce the offensiveness of the perceived leniency of the 
suspension by pointing out all the conditions that could have made a similar assault seem 
worse than the one Rice perpetrated. The second statement functioned to minimize the 
negative backlash on the NFL by pointing out that the organization is made up of many 
individuals who conduct themselves in acceptable and ethical ways. 
 Taking Phase Two communications and applying Heath’s (2006) best practices 
helped to draw attention to several significant failures in the NFL’s crisis response. The 
first prominent issue in this phase was timing itself. The lengthy time gap between the 
inciting incident and the first NFL response violated four of Seeger‘s (2006) and Heath’s 
(2006) recommended practices. Heath (2006) argued that crisis response should be 
viewed as a narrative with beginning, middle, and end. By responding for the first time 
with corrective action five months after the initial event that started the crisis, the NFL 
appeared to be stepping into the crisis  while completely out of touch with the demands 
called for in its crisis response. The organization appeared out of touch with the narrative 
timeline by responding definitively but not adequately (based on the media criticism that 
came afterwards) with corrective action after months of silence and avoidance of the 
crisis, especially when the Ravens officials had consistently been addressing the crisis 
since the beginning. Thus, to the public, the action taken to suspend Rice, though 
inevitable since the NFL is the governing body, likely seemed to come out of no where 
and the organization did nothing to build up or explain its logic with previous 
(non)responses. The organization also appeared out of touch with how this crisis had 
progressed and what the various organizational audiences expected from the NFL’s crisis 
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response, as was displayed with the notable backlash following the two-game suspension. 
This timing also failed to meet the needs of the media, which continued to highlight this 
crisis throughout the months of silence from the NFL, allowing these outlets to control 
the story coming out about the crisis. Taken altogether, these failings also demonstrated a 
lack of planning or policy development and evaluation by the organization in order to be 
prepared for such a crisis. This lack of planning and development neglects Seeger’s 
(2006) first two principles of constantly reevaluating and refining policy and pre-planning 
for any possible crisis that could occur.  
 Besides the timing itself, the initial response of the two-game suspension worked 
to violate another four of Seeger’s (2006) 10 best practices. Seeger (2006) suggested that 
organizations view their public relationships as partnerships, and argued that crisis can 
even foster mutually beneficial relationships. However, Seeger (2006) stipulated that 
partnerships rely on quality communication to strengthen that relationship, and the two-
game suspension communication was met with so much suspicion and animosity by so 
many different audiences, it was clear that the crisis response did not reflect the quality 
expected by the public. Additionally, Seeger (2006) recommended demonstrating respect, 
concern, and aligned interests, but also to communicate compassion and empathy. The 
criticism following the announcement of the two-game suspension and the subsequent 
letter sent to the NFL team owners demonstrated how the response failed to communicate 
these qualities, which were an even more significant requirement considering the nature 
of the crisis and the victims this crisis was addressing. Last, Seeger (2006) also 
highlighted the importance of using messages of self-efficacy to show strength and boost 
confidence. If the intention of the NFL was to demonstrate self-efficacy by coming out 
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with the suspension before any other communication, then they also failed on this best 
practice since the response only served to bring suspicion to the organization about their 
handling of this crisis. 
 While the NFL did show a considerable lack of aptitude where crisis response was 
concerned, Goodell did show some improvement in his final communication in this 
phase. Goodell’s letter to the NFL team owners may not explicitly show, but it did 
promise to commit to actions that will meet two of Seeger’s (2006) practices. By starting 
to listen to and engage with critics, the NFL showed a desire to meet Seeger’s (2006) 
fourth best practice of listening to others. Secondly, by stating that the NFL will work 
with experts to improve both organizational policies and educational programs, the NFL 
also showed a resolve to meet Seeger’s (2006) sixth best practice of collaborating with 
credible sources to strengthen and bring legitimacy to the crisis response and the 
organization. Taken together, these promises can also function to meet the best practice 
of messages of self-efficacy, which can help to ameliorate the lack of attempt at self-
efficacy in the first crisis response. However, at this point in the crisis narrative, only 
time and additional organizational communications will tell if these promises actually 
meet the standards they represent.  
Phase Three: Our Bad 
For this analysis, Phase 3 began with the next significant event to alter the subject 
of the NFL’s crisis responses. This happened when TMZ released a second video on the 
morning of September 8, 2014, with footage from inside the hotel elevator, which 
showed Rice purposely punching Janay in the face (“Key events,” 2014; Van Natta & 
Van Valkenburg, 2014). The next day “TMZ reports the NFL never contacted the casino 
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to request video” of the incident inside the elevator (“Key events,” 2014, para. 23). The 
release of the video and TMZ’s accusations not only stirred new suspicions around the 
NFL’s handling of this crisis with headlines like “Crisis of the Week: NFL’s Handling of 
Ray Rice Scandal” (DiPietro, 2014) and  “Ray Rice Story Slams NFL Image: ‘It’s like 
people are smelling blood’” (Fenno, 2014), but it also put the organization back in the 
position of defending its seemingly lackluster actions rather than releasing statements that 
demonstrated control of the situation. The NFL immediately responded to the video 
release by suspending Rice from the league indefinitely (“Key events,” 2014; Van Natta 
& Van Valkenburg, 2014), and by releasing a statement to CNN through the 
organization’s Vice President of Corporate Communications, Brian McCarthy (“Key 
events,” 2014). McCarthy used a combination of defeasibility and shifting the blame 
when he said, 
Security for Atlantic City casinos is handled by the New Jersey State Policy. Any 
videos related to an ongoing criminal investigation are held in the custody of the 
state police…We requested from law enforcement any and all information about 
the incident, including the video from inside the elevator. That video was not 
made available to us. (“Key events,” 2014, para. 23) 
McCarthy’s comments appeared to argue that any decisions made by the NFL up to that 
point were made based on a lack of information which was based on a lack of access to 
the second video footage, and that this lack of access was not the fault of the NFL but 
was simply part of the policy and procedure followed by law enforcement and the legal 
system.  
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 To reinforce this argument, on Wednesday, September 10, 2014, Goodell sat 
down with CBS This Morning co-host, Norah O’Donnell, to answer questions raised after 
the TMZ release of the elevator video. O’Donnell asked Goodell at the start if the NFL 
had seen the second video, and Goodell used simple denial to answer the question, but he 
also used the same shifting the blame strategy as McCarthy when he explained, “We were 
not granted that [elevator footage]. We were told that was not something we could have 
access to. On multiple occasions, we asked for it. And on multiple occasions we were 
told no” (CBS News, 2014, para. 6). When asked how TMZ could get the video but the 
NFL could not, Goodell responded with a variation of attacking the accuser, “I don’t 
know how TMZ… gets their information. We are particularly reliant on law enforcement. 
That’s the most reliable. It’s the most credible” (CBS News, 2014, para. 10). With this, 
Goodell threw suspicion on how ethical TMZ’s tactics to gain the video were, insinuating 
it did not go through appropriate legal channels while also reinforcing the organization’s 
argument that any perceived shortcoming on the organization’s part regarding this video 
was the outcome of following the law and its limitations.  
 Goodell’s interview with O’Donnell continued to also use defeasibility strategies 
when asked about Rice’s two-game suspension in light of the elevator video. Goodell 
explained, “When we make a decision we want to have all the information that’s 
available. And obviously that was the – that when we met with Ray Rice and his 
representative, it was ambiguous about what actually happened” (CBS News, 2014, 
para.14). In a new twist, Goodell suggested here, that the NFL not only did not have all 
the information because of legal procedure, but that Rice himself did not provide a 
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completely clear account of the events that took place when Rice met with Goodell back 
in June.  
The rest of the interview included several contradictions by Goodell where 
O’Donnell asked him a clarification question and Goodell responded in direct 
contradiction to what he previously stated. For example, Goodell commented that he 
wished he had seen the elevator footage before making his decision about the two-game 
suspension because of the ambiguity of the situation, to which O’Donnell responded, 
“But what was ambiguous about her laying unconscious on the floor being dragged out 
by her feet” (CBS News, 2014, para. 15). Goodell responded to this, “There was nothing 
ambiguous about that. That was the result that we saw. We did not know what led up to 
that. We did not know the details of that” (CBS News, 2014, para. 16). O’Donnell then 
asked, “But what changed?... Did you really need to see a videotape of Ray Rice 
punching her in the face to make this decision” CBS News, 2014, para. 17). Goodell 
answered, “No. We certainly didn’t. And I will tell you that what we saw on the first 
videotape was troubling to us in and of itself” (CBS News, 2014, para. 18). To sum up 
this interview, after denying anyone in the NFL had seen the elevator video, Goodell first 
blamed law enforcement and the legal system and then Ray Rice for the apparent failures 
to respond appropriately to the crisis. Then, Goodell went through a series of questions 
where he attempted to explain the lack of information, only to back track and say that the 
organization actually had all the information it needed from the first video to know how 
bad the situation was.  
On the same day as the CBS interview, Goodell also released an official 
memorandum to all Chief Executives and Club Presidents in the league. This response 
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showed a second attempt by the NFL to provide a consistent and organizationally 
approved message regarding the NFL’s Ray Rice investigation. The memo started out 
just as the interview, with a direct and simple denial of anyone seeing the elevator 
footage before its release by TMZ (Goodell, 2014). Goodell followed this up with a quick 
statement showing corrective action, “When the new video evidence became available, 
we [NFL] acted promptly and imposed an indefinite suspension on Mr. Rice” (Goodell, 
2014, para. 2). Goodell went on to restate the same arguments used by both he and 
McCarthy since the second video release. Goodell attempted to shift blame by listing all 
the law enforcement agencies the organization requested information and videos from 
and when those requests were made (Goodell, 2014). He also reaffirmed his defeasibility 
statement about Rice’s two-game suspension arguing, “As is customary in disciplinary 
cases, the suspension imposed on Mr. Rice in July was based on the information available 
to us at that time” (Goodell, 2014, para. 3).  
Goodell finished out this communication with a combination of minimizing and 
bolstering strategies. He tried to minimize the perceived lack of effort to obtain 
information and video footage by reframing this result as an outcome of cooperating with 
law enforcement. Goodell (2014) states, “Our longstanding policy in matters like this – 
where there is a criminal investigation being directed by law enforcement and prosecutors 
– is to cooperate with law enforcement and take no action to interfere with the criminal 
justice system” (para. 5). He added to this, “Information obtained outside of law 
enforcement that has not been tested by prosecutors or by the court system is not 
necessarily a reliable basis for imposing league discipline” (Goodell, 2014, para. 5). This 
last sentence is important because it functioned as multiple strategies. It helps to 
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minimize offensiveness by again reframing the NFL’s actions as “the right thing to do” 
because they work alongside the law. It also tied back to the attack the accuser tactic used 
in the interview to again bring suspicion on the credibility of media outlets (e.g., TMZ) 
that might not follow the law when obtaining information. Last, the statement also 
functioned as a statement of transcendence because Goodell argued that to ensure that 
discipline imposed by the league is honest, credible, and fair, all values favored by 
American standards of ethics, he had to pursue credible and legal avenues for obtaining 
information.  
This line of crisis response did not last long as media coverage continued to 
speculate on the behavior and actions of the NFL prior to the release of the second video. 
This speculation reached a pinnacle when ESPN’s television program Outside the Lines 
released the findings of their own investigative report on Friday, September 19, 2014. On 
the program’s website, the report provided 14 pages of specific dates and actions by both 
the Ravens and the NFL in response to the initial event in February (Van Natta & Van 
Valkenburg, 2014). Among the many arguments in the report, of most importance were 
the claims that personnel inside the Ravens team viewed and conversed about the 
contents of the elevator video footage before its release in September, the NFL made only 
minimal attempts to obtain the second video footage, NFL arguments stating that 
obtaining this video footage from the hotel would be illegal were discredited, and overall 
the report implied an intentional misdirection by the Ravens and the NFL to cover up 
some aspects of the incident between Rice and Palmer (Van Natta & Van Valkenburg, 
2014). After the release of this report, the NFL’s ability to deny, justify, or transcend the 
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actions (and inactions) which led to this point were irreparably damaged, therefore 
leading to the most significant change in crisis response strategy in this crisis narrative. 
Later in the afternoon on that same day, the NFL held a public press conference 
responding to this most recent event in the crisis, but what was most significant was the 
complete change in response tactics. In this response, Goodell used a few response 
strategies outlined by Benoit (1995), but it was this press conference when the NFL 
fundamentally switched gears and began its atonement campaign. Goodell started this 
campaign almost immediately at the beginning of his speech when he said, “At our best, 
the NFL sets an example that makes a positive difference. Unfortunately over the past 
several weeks, we have seen all too much of the NFL doing wrong” (“NFL commissioner 
Roger Goodell conference,” 2014, para. 2). While not providing any specifics, Goodell 
did not attempt to deny, reduce, or transcend any issues; he simply admitted that the 
organization had done wrong, thereby meeting the first requirement for atonement 
rhetoric. Goodell did acknowledge this wrongdoing in more detail later in his speech 
when he said, 
Our standards, and the consequences of falling short, must be clear, consistent, 
and current. They must be implemented through procedures that are fair and 
transparent. This is the central issue today. I’m here now because our rules, 
policies, and procedures on personal conduct failed to ensure that this high 
standard is met. (“NFL commissioner Roger Goodell conference,” 2014, para. 16-
17) 
Following this first requirement of atonement, Goodell next met the third and 
fourth requirements for atonement, which were demonstrating honest change for the 
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future, and committing public or private acts of mortification to show authenticity of 
remorse (Koesten & Rowland, 2004). Immediately after acknowledging the wrongdoing, 
Goodell stated, “I said this before, back on August 28th, and I say it again now – I got it 
wrong in the handling of the Ray Rice matter. I am sorry for that” (“NFL commissioner 
Roger Goodell conference,” 2014, para. 3). Goodell provided evidence of mortification 
by publicly apologizing for the organization’s failures. Here again, Goodell did not 
specifically ask forgiveness for the transgression, but the intention was implied when he 
also committed in his speech to partner with the National Domestic Violence Hotline and 
with the National Sexual Violence Resource Center to help those organizations that 
represent a particular segment of the “wronged” victims in this crisis. This statement was 
reinforced later on September 28, 2014, when Goodell visited the headquarters of the 
National Domestic Violence Hotline to personally view their operation after the NFL 
made “a multiyear, multimillion dollar pledge of assistance” to the organization 
(Associated Press, 2014, para. 2). This public visit and charitable commitment 
demonstrated the NFL’s attempts to publicly seek atonement and the organization’s 
commitment to honest change for the future, thus displaying the third and fifth 
requirements for atonement. 
In his speech, Goodell verbalized the NFL’s attempt to show sincere change in 
attitude and relationship with the community when he said, “I will get it right and do 
whatever is necessary to accomplish that. First, I don’t expect anyone just to take my 
word” (“NFL commissioner Roger Goodell conference,” 2014, para. 5). He recognized 
the distrustful effect of the many events that had come out of this crisis, so he further 
tried to show the league’s commitment to change by listing the many changes to be 
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implemented (corrective actions). Goodell promised that an independent investigation 
into the NFL handling of this crisis would be launched and run by a former FBI Director, 
Robert Mueller, he reiterated his commitment to providing information about resources to 
all NFL personnel, and to improving policies and educational programs with the 
collaboration of experts in theses areas (“NFL commissioner Roger Goodell conference,” 
2014). Goodell ended the conference with another show of commitment by giving the 
organization a specific deadline of Superbowl 2015, approximately four and a half 
months, to have accomplished all of these changes, and by saying, “I believe in 
accountability. I understand the challenge before me and I will be held accountable for 
meeting it” (“NFL commissioner Roger Goodell conference,” 2014, para. 30).  
Phase Three in this crisis provided the most interesting juxtaposition between 
neglect and merit regarding Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s (2006) best practices. Marking a 
new low for the NFL in this crisis, after the second video release by TMZ and the 
investigative report released by ESPN’s Outside the Lines, the NFL’s crisis response 
appeared a complete failure with the organization failing to meet nearly all best practices. 
The most significant practice neglected by the NFL was Heath’s (2006) twelfth 
recommendation: “Be committed and able to deliver on the promise to be the first and 
best source of information” (p. 248). While the NFL never promised to be the best source 
of information, as these two releases demonstrated, by not being the best media resource, 
an organization loses the ability to control what story comes out in a crisis, it also puts the 
organization in a defensive and reactionary position as opposed to a stronger offensive 
position, and an organization runs the risk of appearing irresponsible, and even unethical, 
in the public eye. By not being the first to admit to the existence of the second video, the 
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subsequent release and storyline weakened the NFL’s position and reputation in the 
public eye. The organization appeared to fail to meet the needs of the media by allegedly 
holding back information. Withholding this particular information also neglected the 
partnership the organization had with its publics, and demonstrated a complete lack of 
respect, concern, compassion, or empathy for those publics, especially victims of 
domestic abuse and sexual assault. In this way, the NFL seemed utterly unable to get its 
response to this crisis right. 
With its image in shambles and its ethical reputation, if not its profitability, on the 
line, the NFL made a dramatic turn around in rhetorical strategy by beginning to use 
atonement rhetoric. In using this form a rhetoric to convey a significant change in the 
organization and the crisis from this point forward, the organization also begins to meet 
the recommendations by Seeger (2006) and Heath (2006) as it meets the requirements for 
atonement. The NFL held the press conference the same day as the release of the Outside 
the Line’s report. Thus, the organization demonstrated how to meet the needs of the 
media by immediately responding to the new threat. In terms of policy, Goodell made the 
statements that policies must be current and that the organization will work with 
appropriate experts to make sure they are both current and effective (“NFL commissioner 
Roger Goodell conference,” 2014). Promising these two things demonstrated Seeger’s 
(2006) best practices for committing to periodically reevaluate policies and to collaborate 
with experts in order to lend credibility to those policies. In listing off the many changes 
he promised to enact, Goodell showed both that he had listened to others and that he and 
the NFL were capable of acting with self-efficacy. Last, pledging support to the national 
domestic and sexual abuse organizations demonstrated the NFL’s attempts to foster new 
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partnerships, which also symbolize an alliance of aligned interests as well as a respect 
and compassion for the people who identify with these organizations.  
Phase Four: Getting Better 
 For crisis response analysis, Phase Four in this crisis did not offer a noteworthy 
amount of variety. In fact, this phase only contained statements meant to show the 
league’s continued commitment to atonement with messages aimed at demonstrating a 
clear commitment to change within the organization and opening communication with the 
organization’s publics. Meeting these particular aspects of atonement were particularly 
important at this time, in light of events that took place after the NFL admitted 
wrongdoing at the end of September.  
 After the NFL’s admission of guilt during the September press conference, Rice 
applied for an appeal of the indefinite suspension passed down by Goodell after the 
release of the in-elevator video. The appeal was overseen by former U.S. District Judge, 
Barbara S. Jones, who heard the appeal over two days and released a 17-page report not 
just reinstating Rice, but calling serious question to the motives and ethics of Goodell and 
the NFL organization (Belson, 2014; O’Connor, 2014). In her report, Jones called 
Goodell’s decision to indefinitely suspend Rice “‘arbitrary’ and in conflict with the facts 
of the case” (Belson, 2014, para. 1). She also questioned the “vagueness” of Goodell’s 
recalling of his meeting with Rice in June of 2014 to discuss the incident (O’Connor, 
2014, para. 9). Last, with Goodell’s entire argument in the arbitration hearing hinging on 
the belief that Rice misrepresented the events of February 15th, after siding with Rice and 
questioning Goodell’s lack of proof, Jones also wrote in her report, “That the league did 
not realize the severity of the conduct without a visual record also speaks to their 
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admitted failure in the past to sanction this type of conduct more severely” (Belson, 2014, 
para. 8). Altogether, these remarks, coming after a public admonition of guilt and failure, 
continued to damage the ethical reputation of the NFL. 
 Thus, in order to continue on the path of atonement, and in an attempt to rebuild 
its image and reputation as an ethical organization, the NFL continued to act to attempt to 
transcend the crisis into December 2014 and January 2015, by focusing on its ongoing 
efforts to learn from and change after the crisis. The first prominent release came on 
December 10, 2014 in which the organization published a public communication to its 
website announcing that all NFL teams had unanimously endorsed a revised Personal 
Conduct Policy with changes made based on shortcomings highlighted by the Ray Rice 
crisis. In conjunction with this announcement, the organization also posted a second 
communication on its website with links to seven different communications including: 
the new Personal Conduct Policy, a quick sheet with key elements of the new policy, a 
listing of individuals appointed to the newly formed Conduct Committee, a list of 
individuals, professionals, and advocate organizations consulted in the process of making 
these changes, a quick sheet on additional steps the NFL is taking beyond the new policy, 
a quick sheet on how the new Personal Conduct Policy will function during 
investigations of misconduct, and the NFL’s mission and values statements (“Information 
on the new personal conduct policy,” 2014).  
 Within the first communication announcing the changes, the NFL took every 
opportunity to publicly demonstrate honest change. The organization explained that it had 
a formal policy for off-field conduct for nearly 20 years, and that the most recent changes 
will enhance the policy so “that it is significantly more robust, thorough, and formal” 
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(“NFL teams unanimously endorse,” 2014, para. 4). In addition to this, the organization 
also enumerated the many changes it was making as corrective action after the crisis. The 
first communication as well as the quick sheet “What the NFL is Doing”, both mentioned 
increased information, education, and medical and counseling resources for all 
organizational personnel and their families (“NFL teams unanimously endorse,” 2014; 
“What the NFL is Doing,” 2014). The quick sheet also mentioned the new partnership 
between the NFL and the National Domestic Violence Hotline and the National Sexual 
Violence Resource Center, as well as a new partnership with the NO MORE campaign 
and the Joyful Heart Foundation to create and air Public Service Announcements 
regarding domestic violence during league games (“What the NFL is Doing,” 2014).  
 In providing these informational resources on its public website, the NFL was 
also demonstrating commitment to show sincere change in attitude and relationship along 
with honest change for the future. Regarding attitude change, the organization’s attempts 
to keep providing information about its changes showed part of that desired attitude 
change called for in atonement. The language used to talk about how the organization 
will conduct itself moving forward also marked this change. For example, “It is a 
privilege to be part of the National Football League. Everyone who is part of the league 
must refrain from conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the 
NFL” (“NFL teams unanimously endorse,” 2014, para. 6). This statement was interesting 
because the organization was no longer trying to minimize the situation by pointing out 
how the majority of the league members act as opposed to a few individuals. Instead, the 
league was stating that appropriate conduct is a responsibility that each member should 
take seriously as a privileged member of the organization. 
 55 
 
 
 
 In terms of honest change for the future, the NFL emphasized in its quick sheet on 
the new Personal Conduct Policy, that the aim of the organization was to not simply 
provide resources for individuals and families after domestic violence has happened, but 
to prevent the attitudes and actions that allow domestic violence to occur through more 
education, specialized trainings, and counseling services (“Key elements of new,” 2014). 
Providing an electronic copy of the Personal Conduct Policy and a quick sheet explaining 
how the policy works during investigations also demonstrated the organization’s 
commitment to open and transparent communication by creating more formalized 
policies and procedures, and then making them available to organizational personnel, 
general publics, and the media, so everyone can know and understand the changes prior 
to new incidents.  
 The next, and last, important communication in this phase was published on 
January 8, 2015, when former FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller, released his report 
looking into the NFL’s handling of the Ray Rice crisis, and specifically addressing 
whether or not officials within the NFL had seen the second in-elevator video prior to its 
TMZ release early in September of 2014. The report concluded that there was not enough 
evidence to prove that the NFL had viewed the footage and knowingly lied about it 
(Mueller, 2015). However, far from exonerating the NFL, the report functioned more as a 
closure but not an eraser. Actually, the report cited several key shortcomings in the 
NFL’s investigation, which could have changed several outcomes in the crisis. Chiefly, 
the report found, “The League’s investigation was limited, but it possessed substantial 
information suggesting a serious event had occurred inside the elevator that the League 
should have further investigated” and that while “That information did not provide the 
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graphic detail that the in-elevator video depicted… it should have put the League on 
notice that a serious assault had occurred and that it should conduct a more substantial 
independent investigation” (Mueller, 2015, p. 6). In its findings, the report stated,  
Our findings demonstrate the weakness inherent in the League’s longstanding 
practice of deferring to the criminal justice system with respect to the 
investigation of facts and the imposition of discipline under the Personal Conduct 
Policy. Discipline should be imposed on the basis of the specific nature of the 
player’s conduct, not solely or necessarily on the disposition of a criminal case. 
(Mueller, 2014, pp. 8-9).  
These statements were significant for two reasons. First, the NFL used its “longstanding 
practice of deferring to the criminal justice system” (Mueller, 2015, p. 8) as a 
defeasibility strategy when responding to several points in the crisis including: why the 
organization had not seen the second video and why it made the two-game suspension. 
Second, the last sentence in the Mueller statement acted as quite an admonishment to the 
organization, and seemingly discredited the organization’s initial bolstering tactic of 
pointing out that it disciplined Rice only when the criminal justice system did not.  
 Despite the minimal help the report offered in rebuilding the NFL’s image, the 
organization and Goodell stayed committed to its atonement rhetoric. Goodell released a 
statement the same day as the report where he expressed his gratitude to Mueller for 
conducting the investigation, and he also made a point to express the organization’s 
acceptance of the reports findings and recommendations (“Statement by commissioner,” 
2015). Goodell also included a message of self-efficacy when pointing out, “We have 
already addressed many of these points [Mueller’s recommendations] in the revision to 
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the Personal Conduct Policy that were announced last month” (“Statement by 
commissioner,” 2015, para. 1). This statement acted to confirm the organization’s 
commitment to honest change, demonstrating that the organization was actually making 
progress on the promises made in the previous phase. In the end, to conclude his 
statements, Goodell further demonstrated that sincere change for the future by reiterating,  
While this investigation has now concluded, our focus on the underlying issues 
and our commitment to positive change remain as strong as ever. We have all 
learned a great deal in the past months and expect to be judged by how we lead 
going forward on issues of domestic violence and sexual assault. (“Statement by 
commissioner,” 2015, para. 2).  
 As Phase Four closed, analysis showed how the NFL, by embracing atonement 
rhetoric, showed much more success in meeting the principles set forth in Seeger (2006) 
and Heath (2006). Several of the December 10th communications demonstrated the best 
practice of periodically reevaluating process approaches and policy development. The 
organization’s communication on “Conduct Committee” specifically stated, “To ensure 
that this policy [new Personal Conduct Policy] remains current and consistent with best 
practices and evolving legal and social standards, the Commissioner has named a 
Conduct Committee… [which] will meet no less than three times per year” (para. 1-2). 
This statement also acknowledged the potential for change, thus also showing Seeger’s 
(2006) best practice of accepting uncertainty and ambiguity. The new Personal Conduct 
Policy’s focus on prevention touched on the best practice for pre-event planning; even if 
the policy was not specifically planning for a crisis, its revisions attempt to mitigate 
future crises of the same conditions. Including the list of experts and organizations 
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collaborated with on these organizational changes also demonstrated Seeger’s (2006) best 
practices of using crisis to build partnerships, listening to others, and collaborating with 
credible sources. Continuing to show organizational change and providing resources not 
just for personnel but also for their families also demonstrated the best practices of 
demonstrating respect and aligned interests with the community, along with 
communicating compassion and concern for those effected by the crisis (Seeger, 2006). 
Last, committing to providing this information to the media, also helps to meet the needs 
of the media and acknowledges the need for response in a crisis narrative,  while also 
proving self-efficacy and that the organization is the best source for new information – 
thereby meeting all of Seeger’s (2006) and Heath’s (2006) 12 best practices. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 Organizational crisis response, in the best of cases, is a complex balancing act in 
which the organization in crisis attempts to weigh the current situational damages with 
the potential costs and benefits attached to each potential avenue of crisis response, all 
while attempting to control information flow, seek new information and data, meet the 
needs of multiple organizational audiences, and determine what further risks exist. If this 
is a best-case scenario, then the NFL’s crisis response in the Ray Rice crisis is an 
exemplary case study in exactly what not to do for crisis communication scholars and 
practitioners alike. From the analysis, this study finds nine different contributions, which 
can either support or add to previous literature.  
 First, Seeger et al. (2003) stated that organizational crises threaten organizations 
by threatening loss of “legitimacy, credibility, reputation, and income” (p. 4); however, 
most studies on organizational crisis focus on how initial failures in the operationalization 
or business management of an organization can lead to such threats. This study 
demonstrates how an organization is just as susceptible to these same losses if the 
organization should mishandle or poorly respond to the personal crisis of an individual 
member of that organization. Thus, it is important for crisis response scholars and 
personnel to understand that personal scandal for individual members, especially highly 
publicized members, can grow into an organizational crisis if it is not addressed promptly 
and in accordance with social moral standards.  
 It is this last understanding about appropriateness and social morals, which 
touches on a second finding from this study. As mentioned above, many crisis 
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communication studies have resulted in split conclusions regarding the effectiveness of 
certain crisis response strategies for certain crisis situations. Rowland and Jerome (2004) 
touch on this issue, specifically, and instead argue that crisis response should include four 
general elements: demonstrating concern for the victim, bolstering organizational values, 
denying intent to harm, and preventing future recurrence. This study helps to support that 
general framework. The NFL’s crisis response in the first two phases, and even part way 
through phase three, does contain bolstering statements about organizational image and 
values, but lacks an overall demonstration of concern for domestic violence victims since 
the organization comes off as protecting Rice more than taking a hard stance against 
domestic abuse. The league’s responses also lack any statements of intent in general, to 
say nothing of preventative measures until the organization embraces a rhetoric of 
atonement approach. It is only after the NFL attempts to demonstrate a sincere change in 
its attitude and relationship toward its community by publicly seeking atonement and 
showing changes for the future that the organization actually starts to rebuild its public 
image by using messages that meet the standards of Rowland and Jerome (2004), but also 
meet several of the best practices regarding showing concern, compassion, and aligned 
interests set out by Seeger (2006).  
 In addition to this, Rowland and Jerome (2004) also stipulate how certain 
additional factors, such as perceived guilt, magnitude of harm, nature of the victims, data 
showing guilt, and violation of traditional moral standards can all require the use of 
additional crisis response strategies in conjunction with the four general elements listed 
above. Interestingly, this study suggests that when an organization encounters not just 
one or two of these extenuating circumstances, but all of them, that an organization’s best 
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course of action is to employ atonement rhetoric. As mentioned earlier, the NFL’s guilt 
did not lie in participating in the events that took place between Rice and Palmer on 
February 15th. The NFL’s guilt lies within its lack of appropriate response to the crisis. 
Goodell mentions on multiple occasions how the organization is seen as a social leader 
with various school and youth programs. So, to see a prominent organization, as a social 
leader, seemingly excuse such concrete evidence of domestic violence presents 
significant questions of harm not just toward detrimentally effecting social/moral 
understanding and acceptance of domestic violence, but also negatively influencing the 
youth in those school programs who look up to the individuals in the NFL as role models. 
With the release of the videos and the reports confirming that the NFL should have had 
enough knowledge to suspect Rice of a more purposeful intent to commit harm in that 
elevator, the organization appears even more guilty and the harms grow as the 
organization’s meager suspension also seems to dismiss, on a more societal level, the 
pain and suffering that all domestic violence victims experience. Coming back from such 
a multi-layered transgression takes a more specific and strategic effort to show sincere 
organizational change, as through atonement strategies.  
 This brings the study’s third and fourth findings into view. One of the most 
significant failings in this crisis was the NFL’s complete inability to command control of 
the crisis for nearly 10 months. From February through November, the NFL, through 
instances of silence and unexpected news releases, constantly appeared to react to new 
information, and haphazardly at that, rather than trying to create and control the crisis 
narrative. Benoit (1995) and Heath (2006) both highlight the importance of how 
organizational crisis responses need to be strategic and well planned – not reactionary. 
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Coombs (1995) adds to this by stating that one of the express purposes of crisis response 
is for organizations to use those responses as opportunities to influence public 
perceptions about the organization and crisis. Thus, when Goodell refused to publicly 
acknowledge the Ray Rice situation for the first five months, and even justified his 
inaction by stating that the legal system had not yet passed judgment on the case, Goodell 
demonstrated an extreme ignorance of crisis communication, and lost prime opportunities 
to shape the crisis narrative to the NFL’s benefit.  
 Throughout this crisis, the NFL showed a fundamental error in judging the 
appropriateness of its responses. Several scholars attempt to answer this question of 
“appropriateness” in crisis response while Seeger (2006) and Heath (2006) essentially 
provide a checklist for what messages “appropriate” crisis responses contain. Coombs 
(1995) found that the appropriateness of a crisis response is often dependent on the 
perceived responsibility and intentions of the organization in crisis. Another such study 
by Benoit and Drew (1997) found that audiences usually tend to favor strategies of 
corrective action and mortification while usually disliking strategies of bolstering, denial, 
and minimization. Within the Ray Rice crisis, the public response to each of the NFL’s 
earliest responses supports both of these findings. The NFL’s earliest responses focused 
heavily on the strategies of bolstering the organization’s image, denying seeing the in-
elevator footage prior to its public release, and minimizing  the situation through various 
comparisons of Rice and other NFL members and of what Rice did versus what he could 
have done. In all cases, the strategies failed to satisfy public outrage because the 
arguments came too late in the crisis narrative and demonstrated no attempt by the NFL 
to listen to the concerns of the public or any demonstration of concern or compassion for 
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those who felt victimized by the crisis. Still more, even the NFL’s use of corrective action 
backfired. From this example, the study can add to Benoit and Drew’s (1997) findings 
with the caveat that corrective action, in order to work, should be proportioned in 
accordance with the transgression committed. In simpler terms, it is recommended that 
crisis responders keep in mind the old adage “let the punishment fit the crime”. As seen 
in this case, the public greatly disapproved of the NFL’s two-game suspension before the 
release of the in-elevator video, and after the release, the NFL was not just answering 
questions about why it made that decision, but also what its intentions were and what 
responsibility the organization has to its fans and society regarding messages of domestic 
and sexual abuse.  
 Coombs and Holladay (2002) offer an additional insight into this conversation of 
appropriateness and responsibility. Coombs and Holladay (2002) argue that an 
organization’s reputation, the way it is perceived by the general public, is a valued 
organizational resource that is threatened in times of crisis. This is an interesting 
perspective when looking at the concepts of responsibility and appropriateness within the 
NFL case study. This discussion already mentions the unique circumstances that pulled 
the NFL into this crisis, but it also bears pointing out that the NFL never faced legal 
trouble or repercussions throughout this entire crisis. The one exception to this would be 
the arbitration hearing in November; however, that hearing was instigated by Rice and 
presented no legal repercussion other than simply reinstating him to the league. As a 
whole, the crisis, as it involved the NFL organization, largely addressed the 
organization’s poor public response to Rice’s personal transgression, thus resulting in 
accusations of misconduct by social moral standards. The crisis also never took place in a 
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judicial court, but only that of public opinion, thus demonstrating how organizational 
reputation is threatened in crisis and how it depends on public perception.  
 This look at public opinion also provides for an interesting discussion about one 
of the NFL’s chief lines of argument throughout Phase Three before moving to atonement 
rhetoric. After the release of the in-elevator video, to respond to questions about how and 
why the NFL only suspended Rice for two games, Goodell used a defeasibility strategy, 
claiming that he and others in the NFL did not have enough information to know that a 
two-game suspension would be an inadequate penalty for Rice’s actions in the elevator. 
Goodell argued that this lack of information stemmed from the organization’s 
“longstanding” policy of working in cooperation with law enforcement and not 
interfering in criminal justice investigations, which resulted in NFL being unable to 
obtain video footage from inside the elevator. Based on reactions to the first responses in 
this phase containing these arguments, and the subsequent move to atonement rhetoric, 
public opinion suggested this was not an appropriate action or justification, and that 
cooperating with criminal and judicial organizations does not negate an organization’s 
responsibility to investigate violations of its own policies to the organization’s fullest 
extent and capability.  
 A discussion of responsibility will inevitably bring the findings of Kruse (1981) 
into the conversation. Kruse (1981) argued that apologia in team sports is ruled by a 
different set of norms and values than that of a general civic society. In team sports, the 
number one responsibility is winning, thus, any action that restricts or impedes this goal 
is cause for apologia. This exact principle is reflected in the language used by Goodell 
throughout this crisis. When looking at the function of a governing sports body, a team’s 
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act of winning is doing exactly that, winning a game; a governing sports body’s act of 
winning is ensuring certain conditions such as security, legitimacy, popularity, and 
profitability. Thus, an organization “loses” when it commits actions that can negatively 
impact these conditions. In this case study, the NFL’s continued failure to address the 
public needs in this crisis threatened the organization’s security, legitimacy, and potential 
popularity and profitability by violating societal moral standards. To amend this situation, 
Goodell did not just have to reaffirm the organization’s commitment and adherence to 
widely accepted social values, but he also had to reaffirm his own commitment to 
ensuring those “winning” condition for football’s players, coaches, owners, investors, and 
most importantly, for its fans. This is why Goodell makes comments about “ensuring that 
the NFL is held in the highest regard by our fans, players, business partners, and public 
authorities” (Gantt, 2014, para. 1) as early as Phase Two, but he reiterates these same 
sentiments in later phases as well.  
 This study’s findings also support Jerome’s (2008) modification of Koesten and 
Rowland’s (2004) theory about atonement rhetoric. Again, as mentioned in the review of 
literature, one of the requirements in Koesten and Rowland’s (2004) presentation of 
atonement rhetoric is the need for the responder to specifically ask forgiveness from those 
wronged in the crisis, though Jerome (2008) finds that atonement can still be achieved 
without an explicit request for forgiveness. Instead, the one using atonement rhetoric can 
still achieve the same effects of the strategy by appearing to receive forgiveness from 
relevant parties without necessarily asking for it (Jerome, 2008). This case study supports 
this modification since the NFL never made an explicit statement asking forgiveness, but 
in working with and receiving cooperation and collaboration from the National Domestic 
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Violence Hotline, the National Sexual Violence Resource Center, the NO MORE 
campaign, and the Joyful Heart Foundation, the NFL appears to have received 
forgiveness from multiple national organizations that represent and work with, arguably, 
the most central group of “wronged” victims in this crisis – victims of domestic abuse 
and sexual assault.  
 Moving now to an example of how this study adds new understanding to previous 
literature, the crisis involving the NFL suggests a new best practice to be added to 
Heath’s (2006) list. This new best practice would highlight the importance of 
organizations to recognize the impact visual evidence, especially video footage, has on 
complicating crisis response while also increasing demand for an appropriate and timely 
response. In the NFL’s crisis, the organization was not in crisis because it did not release 
the video. The NFL found the crisis amplified because the public felt the organization did 
not try hard enough to obtain the second video footage, and the organization’s initial 
suspension to penalize Rice appeared paltry, even disrespectful and negligent, in light of 
that video. Visual evidence of misconduct provides a first-hand account of the events 
leading up to, during, and after an incident of misconduct, therefore potentially reducing 
the ambiguity of a situation and the number of ways it can be explained. Visual evidence 
also allows each viewer to witness and come to his or her own conclusions regarding the 
incident, therefore compounding the crisis response by attempting to respond in an 
appropriate and satisfactory manner to as many opinions as there are viewers of that 
evidence. Thus, this best practice would recommend that organizations not ignore or 
avoid the existence of any visual evidence, but that they exhaust all viable avenues for 
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obtaining such evidence in order to respond accordingly in their rhetoric and their 
corrective actions.  
 The last finding in this study brings support to Seeger et al.’s (2003) view that 
organizational crisis can act as both a positive and negative force. As a positive force, 
crisis can instigate change that might not have otherwise taken place or might not have 
occurred as quickly (Seeger et al., 2003). The NFL crisis involving Ray Rice 
demonstrates this, and Goodell even says this himself. In his September 19th press 
conference, Goodell talks about how this crisis can show how the NFL can “create 
change not only in… [the] league but in society” (“NFL commissioner Roger Goodell 
press”, 2014, para. 6). This argument is supported by the fact that the crisis resulted in 
many positive changes in policy development and implementation. The new Personal 
Conduct Policy received extensive improvements and clarifications after receiving no 
revisions since 2007 (“NFL teams unanimously endorse”, 2014). Additional educational, 
medical, and counseling resources have been added to the organizations list of services it 
will provide to all personnel, staff, and their families (“NFL teams unanimously endorse”, 
2014). Last, this crisis has resulted in a renewed commitment by the NFL to be more 
proactive in assessing and preventing potential crises of this same nature by providing 
these resources, clarifying its definitions, rules, and penalties, and by promising to review 
all of these changes consistently and methodically with the input from multiple experts 
(“NFL teams unanimously endorse”, 2014). 
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